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THE TYRANNY OF BEST INTERESTS: 
STERILIZATION AND THE RETARDED ADULT 
By Kathleen S. Skullney 
"To be a child is to be at risk. dependent, and without 
capacity or authority to decide what is 'best' for oneself. To 
be an adult is to be a risktaker, independent, and with 




retarded adult is both child and adult. yet neither. It 
is a penumbral status, unique because the usual 
coincidence of mental and physical maturity fails. Such an 
adult cannot progress away from the concerns and interests 
of a child toward those of an adult. Rather, mental and 
emotional development for the retarded individual ceases at 
some point prior to reaching physical maturity. Although it 
is a gross simplification of a far more complex combination, 
such an individual displays somewhat adolescent-like at-
tributes and needs of both child and adult. Unlike the 
adolescent, however, the duality is permanent. Thus the 
societal and political interests of this member of the commu-
nity cannot be viewed exclusively from either perspective.2 
Professor Joseph Goldstein notes that one of the basic 
elements of adulthood absent in childhood is "capacity." It 
has been defined as the "mental ability to make a rational 
decision, which includes the ability to perceive, [and] appre-
ciate all relevant facts."3 Capacity, in fact, may be the most 
important distinction between child and adult regarding full 
participation in the greater community.4 Capacity is what 
gives effect to choice. Choice as personal autonomy is an 
obvious and fundamental element of a free society. 5 The 
degree to which an individual is free, then, depends on 
capacity. "[W]e recognize a right to autonomy only for 
persons within a certain range, a range defined by the ability 
to make rational choices about how one's self ought to be 
expressed, realized, and fulfilled."6 
Furthermore, there is a direct relationship between au-
tonomy and the realm in which it is exercised. The existence 
of strong consensus in favor of autonomy within a given 
realm signals a category of rights which should enjoy a 
presumption against exercise or intrusion by another. It is 
intuitively and nearly universally recognized that a person's 
physical body, and the uses to which it is put make such a 
realm .7 
Included in this protected realm of bodily autonomy are 
certain activities that arise naturally with coincidental physi-
cal and mental maturation. One of the most fitndamental is 
human reproduction.s It is in this category of very private, 
subjective activities that the dilemma of the retarded adult is 
most acute. Physical maturity gives her or him the reproduc-
tive rights that society recognizes, but incapacity makes 
choices regarding them impossible. Hence, a retarded adult 
is denied any exercise of those rights. If the choice can only 
be made by the holder of the right, does the right have any 
meaning for a holder who is incapable of choosing? Can it 
be given any meaning by a surrogate chooser? If so, the real 
dilemma for the at risk. dependent, and vulnerable adult is the 
nature of that surrogate. 
Historically, no dilemma existed because society had not 
formally examined procreation as an individual right. Dur-
ing 'the first half of the twentieth century ignorance and 
arrogance led state legislatures and the courts to authorize. 
non-consensual sterilization of the mentally impaired. Eu-
genics, as a science and philosophy was the justification, The 
Supreme Court affirmed the concept of eugenics in the 1927 
case of Buck v. Bell when it upheld a Virginia sterilization 
law. It was perhaps best articulated by Justice Holmes' 
majority opinion that "[t]hree generations of imbeciles are 
enough.''9 Despite the fact that eugenics lost most of its 
scientific validity throughout the following decade, more 
than half the states retained sterilization laws. In Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, procreative ability was again considered by the 
Supreme Court in 1942 and found to be a "basic liberty" 
requiring strict judicial scrutiny if denied. I 0 
Even under Skinner, however, there would have been no 
dilemma for the retarded ad u It. It wasn't unti I the "p ri vacy" 
doctrine was developed that choice as a concomitant right of 
procreation emerged. The right of privacy was found to be 
protected by various amendments in the Bill of Rights and 
was first applied to procreational decisions between husband 
and wife in Griswold v. Connecticut. I I The right of 
procreation and the special relationship of husband and wife 
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combined to focus constitutional protection on the 
procreational decision itself. The same privacy protection 
was found applicable to individual procreation decisions in 
Eisenstadt v. Baird. 12 "If the right of privacy means 
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, 
to be free from governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to 
bear or beget a child."13 
Any doubts about personal autonomy over reproductive 
decisions that may have lingered after Eisenstadt were 
dispelled by Roe v. Wade. 14 The Supreme Court found the 
right of privacy "broad enough to encompass a woman's 
decision whether or not to tern1inate her pregnancy."15 In 
later cases, the Court found reproductive autonomy so 
fundamental that decisional privacy protected abortion choice 
from spousal interference, from parental interference with 
the decisions of "mature" minors, and protected the sale of 
contraceptives to minors.16 Clearly, autonomous rights 
associated with human reproduction cuts across relationship 
lines, and just as clearly they are not restricted to adults. In 
all cases, however, such rights arise in a context of physical 
maturity and capacity. Thus, the dilenm1a of the retarded 
adult in regards to her or his own procreative abilities is 
brought sharply into focus. 
The Legal Response 
Within what one commentator calls the "context of 
reforn1", legal response to issues involving the reproductive 
rights of mentally impaired persons has changed dramati-
cally since the days of Bell. 17 The history of sterilization 
abuse in general and against the re-
tarded in particular, the significant in-
crease in scientific and societal under-
are bound to decisions based on specific statutory or judicial 
criteria or a general statutory ban on non-consensual steril-
ization. In the absence of such requirements, equity courts 
have attempted to compensate for the incompetent's lack of 
capacity to decide by applying either oftwo tests to petitions 
for sterilization. 23 
The most common is the "best interests" inquiry that 
"directs judges to consider and weigh designated criteria in 
determining whether sterilization is in the incompetent person's 
best interest."24 The detennination itself remains within 
judicial discretion. Such valuation is intended to remove 
subjectivity and arbitrariness from the issue.25 Many courts 
attempt to reinforce the objectivity of the test criteria by 
disallowing consideration of any third party or outside 
interests.26 Furthern10re, parents are required to make a 
threshold showing that they have petitioned in "good faith. "27 
The alternative test, less frequently used in sterilization 
cases, is one of substituted judgment. This inquiry requires 
the court to "decide vicariously what the ward would do ifthe 
ward were competent. "28 "The courts thus must endeavor, 
as accurately as possible, to detennine the wants and needs 
of this ward as they relate to the procedure ... "29 This is to be 
accomplished through the doctrine of substituted judgment. 
The factors considered include objective and subjective 
evidence from experts, interested parties, and the retarded 
person herself. "In utilizing the doctrine the court does not 
decide what is necessarily the best decision .. .ifan individual 
would, if competent, make an unwise or foolish decision, the 
judge must respect that decision. "30 Theoretically, at least, 
the court could make an "unwise or foolish" decision on 
behalf of the retarded person. 31 Since no 
court would admit to such a result, judi-
cially considered factors ultimately bear 
standing of mental impainnents, and 
the powerful doctrine of procreational 
privacy have evoked a strong protec-
tionist stance in most courts and a num-
ber of state legislatures. 18 The same 
refonn efforts have resulted in attempts 
to "normalize" retarded individuals so 
they may exercise their rights as fully as 
possible and develop skills to live as 
independently as possible. 19 A survey 
Virtually all courts 
a strong resemblance to "best interests" 




Virtually all courts require a thresh-
old finding of incompetence which may 
include separate consideration of any 
ability to comprehend various aspects of 
reproduction and child bearing.32 Like-
wise, courts rigidly require that the stan-
dard of clear, strong, and convincing 
incompetence . 
of case law reveals that the two types of 
reforn1 are not necessarily in concert. 
Much of the current law is the result of cases that arose 
in the early 1980's. Typically they were, and continue to be, 
brought in the fonn of a petition for sterilization by the 
caretaking parents of a retarded (never competent) daugh-
ter. 20 The two most widely followed cases on the general 
issue of sterilization ofthe mentally impaired can1e about this 
way.21 Courts claim jurisdiction either by statutory authority 
or by the parens patriae authority of an equity court to 
protect those who cannot protect themselves.22 Some courts 
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evidence be met by the proponents of 
sterilization.33 
Despite the assertion made by every 
court that an incompetent person has the constitutional right 
to choose not to conceive a child,34 she is almost never 
allowed by the court, under either test, to "choose" the 
sterilization option. "This heavy burden of proof imposed on 
the petitioner underscores ... that the court must take great 
care to ensure that the incompetent's rights are jealously 
guarded. "35 The Hayes court conceded that "in the rare case 
sterilization may indeed be in the best interests ofthe retarded 
person ... ," but took the position that granting a sterilization 
petition was an invasion of her privacy right.36 
Much of the criticism of this lopsided view of privacy 
centers on basic flaws in both tests. The "best interests" test 
with its stringent "objective" criteria begs the question by 
overvaluing the right of reproduction. Pure substituted 
judgment, when applied to someone who has never been 
competent, is simply a logical contradiction. The court must 
"discern the competent values and preferences of a never-
competent person. "37 
In reality, the two tests combine into one. The court 
determines what it interprets to be in the best interests of the 
incompetent young woman (generally to preserve the right of 
reproduction) and then "substitutes" its determination for 
hers. "Where an incompetent person lacks the mental 
capacity to make that choice, a court should ensure the 
exercise of that right on behalf of the incompetent in a manner 
that reflects his or her best interests. "38 Thus, any discussion 
of "best interests" includes both tests. 
The Legal Requirements 
The Grady court declared that it is the court, not the 
parents which must "determine the need for sterilization." 
Relying heavily on Hayes, it then set forth three requirements 
for doing so. First, a guardian ad litem must be appointed for 
the incompetent person. Second, the court must find by clear 
and convincing evidence that the incompetent person lacks 
present and future decisional capacity. The court empha-
sized the testimony of experts and any possible testimony 
from the incompetent person herself. Third, the "court must 
be persuaded by clear and convincing proof that sterilization 
is in the incompetent person's best interests. "39 At least nine 
factors must be considered in deternlining those interests: 
l)pregnancy potential; 2)potential adverse effects of preg-
nancy; 3)sexual activity potential; 4)present and future 
comprehension of reproduction issues; 5)present and future 
contraception alternatives; 6)immediacy of need; 7)present 
and future parenting abilities; 8)possible technological ad-
vances; 9)the good faith of the petitioners.4o Some courts add 
medical necessity to the list. 41 Most courts use all or some 
combination of the Grady factors. 
The Effects 
Criticisms levelled at this painstakingly scrupulous ap-
proach come from two perspectives. One focuses on how it 
effects the privacy rights of the incompetent individual and 
the other focuses on its effects in a separate, but closely 
related realm of privacy, that of the family. Both aspects 
coincide at a point that has significant importance for re-
tarded adults who continue to live with their families. 
I. The Individual 
Viewed from an individual perspective, the Grady-
Hayes approach fails in two ways. First, it fails to implement 
the true goals of the reforms of which it claims to be a part. 
The adult needs of the retarded person are never considered. 
Every court, sooner or later in its opinion, cites the abuses of 
the past as justification for its stringent review. "We must 
always be mindful of the atrocities that people of our own 
century and culture have committed upon their fellow hu-
mans. "42 "Sterilization has a sordid past in this country -
especially from the viewpoint of the mentally retarded. "43 
"This record of past abuses necessitates governmental pro-
tection of a mentally retarded person's rights."44 While 
freeing the retarded from abusive governmental and societal 
intrusion, such a heavy historical burden on the sterilization 
issue has imposed equally intrusive governmental protec-
tions. In effect, one set of limitations simply replaced 
another. "Any governmentally sanctioned (or ordered) 
procedure to sterilize a person who is incapable of giving 
consent must be denominated for what it is, that is, the state's 
intrusion into the determination of whether or not a person 
who makes no choice shall be allowed to procreate." 45 
The second failure is a more important one because it has 
a more significant effect. The use of objective criteria by 
which a third party attempts to simulate the most personal 
and subjective of decisions seems to miss what the Constitu-
tion actually protects. Skinner recognized the individual 
fundamental right to procreate and Eisenstadt implicitly 
recognized its reciprocal, the right not to procreate. What 
Eisenstadt explicitly recognized, as had Griswold before it, 
was the profoundly private nature of "the decision whether 
to bear or beget a child" and the impropriety of governmental 
intrusion.46 "[W]hether one person's body shall be the 
source of another life must be left to that person and that 
person alone. "47 In other words, the right of reproductive 
privacy consists of two equally protected alternatives. The 
means of affording equal protection is the personal decision, 
signalling which of the alternatives has the least value to the 
rightholder. The Constitution protects not just a decision 
between the two alternatives, but a personal decision be-
tween the two. 
The fault we find [is] first concluding ... that 
the right to sterilization is a personal choice, 
but then equating a decision made by others 
with the choice of the person to be sterilized. 
It clearly is not a personal choice, and no 
amount of legal legerdemain can make it 
SO.48 
The problems inherent in court self-assignment of such a 
decision are evident. The issue is one of choice, yet the 
individual for whom the choice is being made has had no say 
in who will make it. Her possible, but inarticulable prefer-
ences, in the matter have not been explored. Since the court 
is one of equity guided by conscience, she is then subjected 
to the basic value system of the deciding judge. Inevitably, 
"[the] 'best interests' argument is a nile requiring that...a 
Judge should invoke his or her own moral, philosophical, 
theological and sociological precepts in deciding whether the 
operation should take place."49 
23.31U. Bait. L.F. - 15 
A further problem is deciding how to make the choice. 
One reproduction alternative is inevitably pitted against the 
other, resulting in the one with the least error potential being 
inevitably favored. The "error" in choosing sterilization had 
been considered its irreversibility, 50 making it presumptively 
less favored. Without going any further, the judicial decision 
is already suspect. If procreation begins as the objectively 
favored choice, no genuine effort is made to assess the 
possible subjective value of non-procreation to the incompe-
tent person (or in the alternative the non-value of procre-
ation.) Professor Scott suggests that a person who has no 
comprehension of reproductive, child bearing and child 
rearing processes has no protected interest in them. There-
fore, "the decisionrnaker should not exaggerate the retarded 
person's interest in procreation when determining whether 
sterilization is appropriate."51 Because of sterilization's 
historical burden, courts have frequently viewed suggested 
benefits of sterilization as accruing to the proponents of the 
procedure rather than the retarded person herself.52 
This highlights a problem with the Grady criteria, and 
probably with any objective, rationally defensive criteria as 
well. The conscious isolation of more subjective consider-
ations such as normalization goals and possible "lifestyle" 
needs tends to force these concerns into an adversarial 
position with the more objective 
The Supreme Court has come close to this issue only once. 
In Stump v. Sparkman, the Court upheld the judicial" immu-
nity of an Indiana judge who had ordered the sterilization of 
a marginally retarded young woman. 56 She was not informed 
ofthe nature of the procedure and found out only later after 
she married and attempted to have a child. This case is often 
cited in support of judicial over-protectiveness, but that 
misses a greater point. No matter which way the court errs, 
the incompetent person has no remedy because the person 
who erred is immune. A woman who is denied sterilization 
may be significantly harmed by a subsequent pregnancy. It 
is a sobering irony that her parents would then have to 
petition the court again to obtain an abortion. Had her 
parents or any other third party denied her sterilization, she 
may have a cause of action against them. When a judge 
denies it, she has none. 57 
Another significant equality interest that may be ob-
scured by an artificially narrow emphasis on the procreative 
right is that of opportunity. "American society, while 
valuing freedom, also values equality - especially equality of 
opportunity. "58 Freedom of opportunity in both employment 
and social interaction may depend on the degree of supervi-
sion required, which in turn may depend on how vulnerable 
the individual is to pregnancy. Extremely vulnerable women, 
unable to prove by clear and convinc-
concerns expressed in the criteria. 
This seems to be especially true 
when subjective benefits are sug-
gested by parents or other non-
technical parties. "[I]n the ques-
tion of sterilization the interests of 
the parents of a retarded person 
cannot be presumed to be identical 
with those of the child."53 Grant-
ing that, it does not necessarily 
follow that the interests of parent 
and child are mutually exclusive 
and a shared benefit is therefore 
immediately suspect. Furthermore, 
factors like those outlined in Grady 
By refusing to 
consider the 
family context, 
ing evidence that such a social need is 
determinative, may have such oppor-
tunities foreclosed by supervision re-
quirements. "Sterilization is, then, 
actually a means of maximizing the 
freedom of the mentally incompe-
tent. "59 "[S]terilization ... could well 
facilitate the entry of these persons 
into a more nearly normal relationship 
with society."6O The unwarranted 
burdening of the sterilization option 
clearly raises freedom of association 
issues. 61 
the court denies itself 
the best key to 
who she is and 
what her values 
might be. 
do not, and cannot, represent the 
fu 11 range of reasons competent women employ when making 
reproductive choices. A recent newspaper report that dis-
cusses a new procedure for controlling or eliminating men-
struation and causing infertility cites "convenience" as the 
single reason given by at least 10% of the women seeking it. 
Other women, a marathon runner for instance, cited the 
demands of their lifestyles. 54 The exclusion of such consid-
erations by the courts effectively discriminates against in-
competent women who may have greater interests in sterility 
than in procreation. 
A further effect of decisions by self-assigned judges 
exists. While the possibility of irreversible sterilization error 
weighs heavily on the courts, the legal ramifications of 
continued fertility "error" are almost never considered. 55 
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2. The Family 
The right to enjoy intimate rela-
tionships is the right that brings the individual retarded 
person into the second important aspect of privacy and is the 
aspect from which the objective "best interests" test receives 
its severest criticism. This aspect is the family and its 
importance to an adult who also remains a child. 
Professor Tribe notes that "the family unit does not 
simply co-exist with our constitutional system but is an 
integral part of it, for our political system is superimposed on 
and presupposes a social system of family units, not just 
isolated individuals. "62 The family has been characterized as 
a necessary limitation on governmental power. "[T]he 
structure of formal family life emphasizes that sense of 
'ordered liberty' necessary to achieve individual liberty as a 
long-range objective."63 The importance offamily has long 
been recognized by the Supreme Court, which afforded it 
privacy protection years before affording Constitutional 
protection to human reproduction.64 
Such importance has resulted in favored legal status. The 
legal presumption that the family operates in the best inter-
ests of its members pervades other areas of family law, 
sometimes to the significant harm of a member. Case law is 
replete with the victims of abuse and neglect on whose behalf 
the state was reluctant to interfere with family relation-
ships.65 The absence of "best interests" consideration in 
certain parental actions is also remarkable. Judges are not 
"required" to review the consent for adoption of a child given 
by a natural parent, yet that decision has life-altering conse-
quences for the adoptee. The Supreme Court upheld the 
presumption against a challenge to state laws that allowed 
the commitment of children to mental institutions by parents 
without a reviewable procedure. "[W]e conclude ... that the 
traditional presumption that the parents act in the best 
interests of their child should apply."66 It is difficult to 
understand the singularly rigorous scrutiny of the steriliza-
tion issue. 
Greater than the presumption that the family is not acting 
in her interest, however, is the effect of not viewing the 
incompetent person from her position within her family. By 
refusing to consider the family context, the court denies itself 
the best key to who she is and what her values might be. 
"Family relationships, by their nature, involve deep attach-
ments and commitments to the necessarily few other indi-
viduals with whom one shares not only a special community 
of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively 
personal aspects of one's life."67 
Many commentators interpret the Constitutional protec-
tion of the family as including the family relationships 
themselves, and that any significant governmental intrusion 
disrupts and may potentially destroy those relationships. 
[I]t is naive to suppose that the state's 
interests in guaranteeing individual liberty, 
and a family unit's commitments to each 
other through shared goals and obligations, 
are mutually reinforcing. That is why we 
deceive ourselves if we think that we can 
temporarily emancipate children from their 
parents and families, and then return them 
without consequence, as though no intru-
sion into the family bond had occurred, as 
though no violation of the family's commit-
ments had happened. 68 
Children, and incompetents remaining with their families, 
have a liberty interest in the care, stability, and protection 
they receive from their families. This interest depends on the 
preservation of mutual family relationships and that mutual-
ity includes having decisions made by their families on their 
behalf. "Constitutional liberties protect children in the 
exercise of choices that their parents have made for them. "69 
By removing not only the sterilization decision from the 
family, but any ability to affect its outcome, the court 
seriously tramples on an important liberty interest of the 
retarded person. 
Conclusion 
It would appear that the courts cannot accomplish their 
protective purpose by the method they have chosen without 
a high costto the individual being protected and to her famil y. 
The problem is relatively simple. An exclusive individual 
right to choose among reproductive alternatives cannot be 
exercised by the retarded person. Yet it is desirable that a 
choice be made. The question then becomes who is in the next 
best position to choose for the individual? The courts have 
arrogantly answered that they are and have attempted to 
reach the most intimate of decisions by means of rigorously 
imposed objective criteria. The result is the exaggeration of 
a single alternative amid a glaring lack of intimacy. 
A better answer is a decision made by those who can come 
closest to matching the intimacy and subjectivity that would 
characterize a decision made by the individual herself. "We 
share our selves with those with whom we are intimate and 
are aware that they do the same with us. "70 "Friendship, 
love, and family represent institutions in which intimacy is 
central to the relationships. ''7) 
The difficulty is specifying who has an 
interest that is in fact allied without first 
deciding what is good for the child (or 
incompetent person)-the very point at is-
sue. One possibility is to look for an adult 
who might automatically suffer if the wrong 
decision is made for the child. Clearly that 
person has an incentive to determine the 
child's real interest and assure that it is 
advocated. Parents may typify this kind of 
representative, because as long as they live 
with the child, and often thereafter, they 
bear the consequences of the child's misfor-
tune or unhappiness.72 
The courts do not.73 
The courts could adequately fulfill their protective role, 
however, by a threshold determination of the level of compe-
tency of the impaired individual and the good faith of the 
individual's surrogate. Historical abuse notwithstanding, 
they should intrude no further. "[T]he imbedding of a choice 
within a close human relationship ... should always be re-
garded as significantly increasing the burden of justification 
for those who would make the choice illegal or visit it with 
some deprivation. "74 
The answer to the simple question of who should decide 
the undecidable cannot help but reflect a fundanlental view 
of the relationship between the individual and the govern-
ment. "[I]t is a profoundly paternalistic and pessimistic 
notion that political functionaries should be presumed better 
23.3/U. Bait. L.F. - 17 
able to make private healthcare decisions than the family. "75 
To have such decisions made by any branch of government 
is U a particular kind of creeping totalitarianism, "76 a tyranny 
of best interests. 
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